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STASi , i . U . M . I ,

)
:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
DILLON

)

vs.
DOUGLAS DOYLE DILLON,
Defe

)

Case No. 220010384-CA

)
)

Argument Priority: (15)
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JURISDICTION
This appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to
Uia.
appeal from a court of record in a criminal case not involving a conviction of a first
degree or capital felony.
STATEMENT of ISSUES
ISSUE NO. I I he first issi

appeal is whether or not th^ trial •

i ••

•

in allowing the State to present evidence of Defendant/Appellant's prior bad acts
over the objection of defense counsel and upon the basis of the same constituting
nt of the offense o f «
ISSUE NO. 2: The additional issue on appeal is whether or not the trial court
erred in not allowing the Defendant/Appellant to wear street clothing of his choosing
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which was not otherwise objectionable where he was allowed to wear street clothing
chosen by law enforcement or whether or not the trial court erred in having the
Appellant shackled in front of the jury and no instruction given.
STANDARD of REVIEW
Appellant believes the central issue involves Rules 402,403 and 404(b), Utah
Rules of Evidence, 1953, as amended, as recently decided in State of Utah v.
Decorso, 1999 UT 57, (Utah 1999), post 1998 amendment, which if anything
changed the standard of review from one of limited deference to the trial court's
discretion to that of abuse of discretion adopting the Dibello line of cases, see State
v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). In State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221 (Utah
1989), the Utah Supreme Court made it clear that while as a matter of law certain
categories of evidence are presumptively unfairly prejudicial, the trial judge is the
one primarily responsible for making the evaluation of whether the proponent of the
evidence has overcome that presumption.
The remaining issue is one sounding in due process requiring that an accused
receive a trial before a fair and impartial jury, free from outside influences. State v.
Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1348 (Utah 1977), rehearing denied, 576 P.2d 857 (Utah
1978), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 882, 99 S.Ct. 219, 58 LEd.2d 194 (1978); Irwin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639,1642,6 LEd.2d 751, 755 (1961). In the
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context that the matter involves an issue of law, the Appellant believes that the
standard is one of correctness.

When faced with a question of statutory

construction, the reviewing court first looks to the plain language of the statute. See
State v. Larson. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993). When the matter involves a
factual issue, the standard of review would be "clearly erroneous". The procedural
issues on motions to suppress or the introduction of evidence at trial, are generally
mixed issues of law and fact. Where evidence of prior criminal acts is admitted to
prove motive, or opportunity, intent or the like, the Court should give a cautionary
instruction to the jury to use the evidence only for the specific purpose for which it
is admitted, but failure to so instruct does not necessarily constitute prejudicial error.
See State v. Smith. 700 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The statutory and regulatory provisions which Appellant believes applicable
are as follows:
Rules 402, 403 and 404, Utah Rules of Evidence (1953, as amended).
PRIOR JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
The prior judicial authority which Appellant believes applicable is from the
Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Decorso, 1999 Utah 57, (Utah 1999), and
///
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it is Appellant's contention that the trial court in the instant case failed to follow the
analysis of this prior judicial authority.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE of the CASE: This action concerns the Appellant, DOUGLAS
DOYLE DILLON, convicted by jury trial on March 23, 2001, on the charges of
burglary of a dwelling and receiving stolen property, each a third degree felony.
Prior to the trial, the Appellant, shackled, requested to wear his street clothes which
were in storage at the jail. A brief recess was taken and the Appellant was brought
a dress shirt and tie. The Appellant continued to object stating that he wanted the
opportunity to select his own clothing and in the course of doing so discussed his
concern about being shackled in the court room. See trial transcript at pages 8
through 10. At trial, the State attempted to introduce evidence Exhibits 13 and 14,
a pawn slip and a swap meet receipt, and defense counsel objected on the grounds
that the exhibits were not related to the pending charges, did not involve stolen
property, but were being used by the State to show some furtherance of a plan or
design unrelated and untied to the case. See trial transcript at pages 54 and 55.
The Court sustained the defense counsel's objection. In the afternoon, upon the
State's further attempt to introduce the exhibits the Court again sustained the
objection of defense counsel. The State asserted that the exhibits were a necessary
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element to the State's case on the charge of possession of stolen property. See trial
transcript at pages 74-78. The trial court reversed its previously ruling and allowed
the exhibits to be introduced. A jury instruction was given, instruction number 14a
see the record at 00057, which states that knowledge or belief that property is
stolen, required by the receiving stolen property instruction, is presumed in a case
of an actor who is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a
separate occasion. The instruction goes on to say that this presumption does not
relieve the State from proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. However, the instruction does not caution the jury to be careful not to convict
the Appellant on the pending charges on the basis of prior acts from events
unrelated to the offenses. In fact, the inference drawn from the instruction is that the
jury can presume that the Appellant was guilty of a crime for the possession of
stolen property if in possession or control of property stolen on a separate occasion.
No other instruction was offered or given regarding such a caution. Based on the
evidence received and the instructions given, the Appellant was found guilty of the
crimes, burglary of a dwelling and receiving stolen property. The Appellant declined
the preparation of a presentence report and was sentenced to serve zero (0) to five
///
///
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(5) years, the charges to run concurrently with each other but consecutive to any
other sentences not handed down by that Court. The Appellant was placed in the
in the custody of the Utah State Department of Corrections.
STATEMENT of FACTS
1.

On or about the 18th day of January, 2001, Thomas Braun, a local

contractor discovered that his tools had been stolen the previous evening at a
construction site. See trial transcript at page 35.
2. At trial, the testimony of officer Kelly Edwards was proffered to the Court
regarding his report that the Appellant had been stopped and questioned about
property in his possession which appeared to be construction equipment, particularly
a Honda generator. See trial transcript at pages 33 and 34.
3.

Through investigation, Detective Mark Gower discovered tools and

equipment meeting the description of Mr. Braun in the possession of Appellant
together with other tools and equipment believed to have been stolen from other
construction sites in different areas of southern Utah, including Millard County. See
trial transcript at pages 48 to 51.
4. Sometime prior to trial in Iron County, the Appellant entered into pleas of
guilty to two (2) counts of attempted receiving stolen property, each a class A
misdemeanor.

Page 6 of

23

5. At trial, Appellant requested from the Court the right to choose street
clothing suitabi

trial and discussed with the Court the nw»<1 to be shackled in the

presence of the jury. The Court denied the Appellant the right to choose his own
clothing but Appellant was provided with a dress shirt and tie and was required to be
shackled in the presence of the jury.
6. At trial, the State attempted to introduce Exhibits 13 and 14, Exhibit 13, a
pawn shop receipt and Exhibit 14, a swap meet receipt. See the Exhibit list, at the
record 00079. See also trial transcript at pages 54, 55, 73 through 78. While there

property, and it was made clear that they did not involve property that was stolen in
the in case involving the pending charges, it was never clarified as to whether or not
the receipts in fact represented stolen property or pertained to othei pending
offenses in another jurisdiction. Without clarification, the jury was instructed to
presume that the Appellant had knowledge or belief that property was stolen if he
was found in possession or in control of other property stolen on a separate
occasion. See jury instruction at the record at page 00057. There was no cautionary
instruction advising the jury not to find the Defendant guilty of the pending charges
simply because he was presumed to have knowledge if he was in possession of
property stolen on a separate occasion.
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7. The Appellant was found guilty of the charges of burglary of a dwelling and
receiving stolen property, each a third degree felony, and sentenced to serve zero
(0) to five (5) years concurrently with each charge but consecutive to any other
charges that Appellant may have, presumably the Millard County class A
misdemeanor offenses.
8. Notice of appeal was initially filed on or about the 16th day of April, 2001,
and upon the Court of Appeals Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition, and
upon the Stipulated Motion for Remand and Final Order, the matter was remanded
to the trial court and Appellant's sentence was entered on the 5th day of June, 2001.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. The trial court erred in allowing the admission of State's Exhibits 13 and
14, a pawn slip and swap meet receipt, at trial where the Court failed to properly
apply the analysis of State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, and Appellant asserts that
proper consideration would have led to the exclusion of such evidence. First, the
trial court did not consider the matter in light of the requirements of Rule 402, Utah
Rules of Evidence.

Had it considered the evidence from the stand point of

relevancy, it would have required that a proper foundation be laid to connect the
exhibits to items of stolen property. Since this was not done, the jury was instructed
to presume that the exhibits did represent items of stolen property from another
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location. Moreover, the exhibits submitted would not be generally found relevant to
establish knowledge of stolen property, rather evidence of previous convictions. In
this case, the evidence of previous convictions was for misdemeanors and nol
admissible. Second, the trial court failed to consider the evidence for prejudicial
concern pursuant to Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. In this case, while the

the existence of any fact more or less probable, its prejudicial impact is substantial
and significant in that it allowed the jury to presume the matter of Appellant's prior
acts that inferred guilt in the context of establishing knowledge for a crime of
receiving stolen property. The distinction in the purpose of the evidence was never
adequately explained to the jury and it is unlikely that the jury figured it out on its
own. Third, the instructions that were given regarding the prior acts problem were
not only inadequate, they were misleading. After reading the instructions as given
one of reasonable intelligence is led to believe that it was proper to presume that the
Appellant was guilty of receiving stolen property simply by having possession of a
pawn slip and swap meet receipt I hen: wdsnoi.Hutionarv instruction given and the
trial court made no explanation to limit the scope and purpose of the evidence. Last,
the Court allowed the evidence in as part of the State's case in chief. The evidence
no matter how characterized is clearly character evidence if it is relevant at all and
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not the elementary evidence that the State attempted to argue. It should not have
been allowed to be introduced as part of the case in chief.
B. The trial court erred in not allowing the Appellant to wear street clothing of
his choosing and requiring him to be shackled in front of the jury without some
specific concern for security. There is a due process consideration to not unduly
interfere with an accused's right to defend and such measures of control
unnecessarily exercised can and do have an impact upon a standard defense. The
security concern should not be imposed routinely or as a matter of administrative
policy of the correctional facility. Such measures should only be imposed when the
specific circumstances of the case considered by the trial court warrant them. Such
circumstances did not exist in this case.
ARGUMENTS
A.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE ADMISSION OF STATE'S
EXHIBITS 13 AND 14 AT TRIAL.
The central issue of Appellant's appeal before the Utah Court of Appeals is
whether or not the trial court erred in admitting Exhibits 13 and 14 and if it was error
whether the same constituted reversible error. The Appellant believes that the
matter was not analyzed in the context of State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57, and as a
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result was admitted without proper and due consideration given to Rules 402 and
403, Utah Rules of Evidence. The Appellant further contends that the pawn slip and
swap meet receipts did not involve stolen property. However, the jury was allowed
to make that inference and in fact presume that the possession of such receipts
raised a presumption that Appellant had knowledge that he was in possession of
stolen property. The Appellant believes that appropriate analysis and consideration
under the direction of the Rule and as explained in Decorso would have led to the
exclusion of the evidence as being not relevant and/or substantially more prejudicial
than probative and further confusing the issues or misleading the jury into making
presumptions about the evidence diminishing the State's burden of proof. Rule
404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, reads as follows:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not inadmissable to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intend, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence
offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character
purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403. (Emphasis
added).
The last sentence was added by amendment in 1998, and makes
clear that the admissibility of such evidence requires more than a showing that the
evidence is for a non character purpose and must meet the requirements of Rules
of 402 and 403. The State initially attempted to introduce the evidence anticipating
Page 11 of
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that Detective Gower would testify as to modis operendi or plan, showing a common
or scheme. See trial transcript at page 55. The State then attempted to introduce
the exhibits as an exception to the hearsay rule involving public records and reports
or judgment of previous convictions. However, the evidence was not in the form of
a judgment of a previous conviction and the previous conviction was for the charge
of attempted possession of stolen property in Millard County involving
misdemeanors which did not involve a crime punishable by imprisonment in excess
of one (1) year. The Court again denied admissibility. See trial transcript at pages
33 and 34.
On the third attempt, the State attempted to introduce the exhibits as essential
elements to the crime of possession of stolen property. The charge of receiving
stolen property, as applied in the instant case, not only diminishes the importance
of the rule excluding prior bad acts for character purposes but allows for the use of
a presumption of knowledge in establishing the offense and thereby deluding the
State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The confusion was present in
the instant case in part because the pawn slip and swap meet receipt were not for
items of property determined to have been stolen on a prior occasion. In short, the
jury was allowed to infer that by the introduction of Exhibits 13 and 14 that in fact
they did represent items of stolen property from another occasion which allowed the
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jury to presume that the Defendant had knowledge that the items were stolen in his
possession in the instant case. The Appellant asserts that this procedure was in
error for the following reasons.
POINT NO. I
The Trial Court Did Not Consider The Matter In Light Of The Requirements
Of Rule 402, Utah Rules Of Evidence.
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, sets forth the requirements for admissibility
of relevant evidence and simply states that all relevant evidence is admissible. If
evidence is not relevant it is not admissible. Relevant evidence is defined by Rule

having a tenancy to make the existence of any fact that is a consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence. In light of that definition, it is evident that the introduction of the pawn
slips was not relevant to the trial at hand. The inference drawn from the pawn slips,
that they represented slips or receipts for items of stolen property on another
occasion might have been relevant if the foundation had been laid properly.
However, no such foundation was made and the pawn slip and swap meet receipt
were introduced under that inference when in fact they did not represent evidence
or prior stolen property. Consequently, the evidence that was introduced at trial was
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crime of receiving stolen property. The Appellant was not found in possession or
control of other property stolen on a separate occasion. He was found in possession
of a pawn slip and a swap meet receipt which was believed to be for property stolen
on a separate occasion but which no foundation was laid to determine as much.
Even the evidence as submitted by the State under the argument that it was
essential to establish their case for receiving stolen property did not meet the
requirements of the statute. Bare, unproven allegations or "complaints" of prior
incidents of similar conduct have no relevancy to the issue of Defendant's
truthfulness or veracity. Admissions of such evidence without further explanation
could only have caused the jury to speculate about the Defendant's propensities to
commit such crimes and confuse the issues, all to the prejudice of the Defendant,
which necessitates a new trial. See State v. Goodliffe. 578 P.2d 1288,1290 (Utah

1978).
POINT NO. II
The Evidence Should Have Been Excluded As Substantially More Prejudicial
Than Probative, Under Rule 403.
The application of Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, is often confusing and
misleading in terms of its application. However, in this case, there can be no
question about the unfair prejudicial tendency that the evidence would have in
influencing the trial improperly to draw the presumption that the Appellant has the
Page 14 of
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requisite knowledge under the crime of receiving stolen property. Evidence is
unfairly prejudicial if it has a tendency to influence the outcome of the trial by
improper means, if it appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror,
provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise causes a jury to base its decision on
something other than the facts of the case. See Terry v. Zion's Cooperative
Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, McFarland
v. Skagqs Company Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1985); see also State v. Bartley, 784
P.2d 1231 (Ut App 1989). In the instance case, the trial court clearly abused its
discretion in allowing the evidence to be admitted. However, it is Appellant's belief
that because the Court had sustained defense counsel's opposition to the evidence
on at least two (2) prior occasions, that the evidence when finally admitted was given
a heightened sense of importance that only further confused the jury in
understanding its significance for assessing weight. That is, it put the Appellant in
an even worse light than if the evidence had been admitted from the start. Thus,
although the trial court did not enter into this type of analysis, its prejudicial impact
was intensified due to the process in which it was introduced and its probative
importance was never clearly established. Consequently, the impact upon the jury
was substantial.
///
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POINT NO. Ill
The Jury Instruction Given At The Time Of Trial Was Inadequate And Misleading.
A standard jury instruction for the crime of receiving stolen property was given
in instruction number 14. However, instruction number 14a, the record at page
00057, states that knowledge or belief that the property is stolen required by the
receiving stolen property instruction, is presumed in the case of an actor who is
found in possession or control of other property stolen on a separate occasion. No
part of the instruction attempts to caution the jury to not find the Appellant guilty of
this offense upon a belief that he was guilty of offenses in another case. In situations
where relevant evidence may be admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for
another, such as the situation at hand, the trial judge upon request shall restrict the
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly. See State v. Smith,
700 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985). Therefore, it is error not to give a limiting
instruction. In the instant case it is clear that the outcome of the trial was affected
by the Court's failure to give the appropriate instruction.
///
///
///
///
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POINT NO. IV
The Court Erred In Allowing The State To Introduce The Evidence As Part Of Its
Case and Chief.
A predecessor to the present Rule 404(b) was Rule 55, Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971) which provided that evidence... that a person committed a crime is
inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit crime ... but, ... such evidence is
admissible when relevant to prove some other material fact... motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or identity." See State v. Hansen. 588 P.2d
164,167, footnote 12 (Utah 1978). Pursuant to that Rule and in conjunction with the

permitted to proceed in its case in chief to introduce evidence of past offenses of
misconduct of a Defendant. Id. 164 (Utah 1978). While the statutory language has
changed, the underlying fundamental principle is no different and in fact continues
to be an assumption made by most trial court's that evidence of prior bad acts of
misconduct is not permitted in the case in chief of the State. As in the above case,
where one cannot say with assurance that the result would have been the same if
the mandate of the statute had been complied with, the reviewing Court is not
justified in concluding that the error was not prejudicial to the Defendant. As a result,
it is necessary that the judgment be reversed and the case be remanded for a new
trial. See also State v. Seabert, 6 Utah ;>d 198 310 P I'd 388 (1957)
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a
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE APPELLANT TO WEAR
STREET CLOTHES OF HIS CHOOSING AND HAVING THE DEFENDANT
SHACKLED IN FRONT OF THE JURY.
The remaining issue of Appellant is one that is not well defined within the
precedent of the State of Utah. In fact, the attorney for Appellant is unable to find a
single case addressing the issue from the standpoint of a right to wear clothing of
one's choosing at the time of trial. There is, however, imbedded within the notion of
a fair and speedy trial, a due process provision requiring that an accused receive a
trial before a fair and impartial jury, free from outside influences. See State v. Pierre,
572 P.2d 1338,1348 (Utan 1977), rehearing denied, 576 P.2d 757 (Utah 1978), cert,
denied, 439 U.S. 882,99 S.Ct. 219 58 LEd.2d 194 (1978). In State v. Gardner, the
Utah Supreme Court addressed the principle from a stand point of security. In that
case, four (4) unarmed plain clothed guards were present at trial. Two (2) sat behind
the Defendant and two (2) stationed themselves elsewhere in the courtroom. The
Defendant was accused of being involved in an attemptto escape while incarcerated
but appearing on a hearing at the Metropolitan Hall of Justice in Salt Lake City,
attorney Michael Burdell was killed and others were wounded. In addressing the
security measure in that case, the Court distinguished the case of People v. Duran,
Page 18 of

23

a California Supreme Court Case, which sets forth the basic common law rule
established for the State of California in People v. Harrington. 42 Cal. 165 (1871),
stating:
[A]
"any order or action of the Court which, without evidence necessity,
imposes physical burdens, pains and restraints upon a prisoner during
the progress of his trial, inevitably tends to confuse and embarrass his
mental faculties, and thereby materially to abridge and prejudicially
affect his constitutional rights of defense; and especially would such
physical bonds and restraints in like matter materially impair and
prejudicially affect his statutory privilege of becoming a competent
witness and testify in his own behalf." See Duran at 545 P.2d 1326
(Cal 1976).
In the instant case, the inquiry taken place before the Court regarding the
wearing of street apparel lead in part to an explanation as to why he would be
shackled in the courtroom before the jury. See trial transcript at pages 6 thought 9.
The Appellant was concerned about the impact that his appearance would have in
front of a jury and this also included him being restrained. However, counsel did not
object specifically to the restraint and therefore it may have been waived. The
Appellant asserts that the issue is not one simply of what restraint is required at trial
but goes to the issue of allowing the accused to properly prepare for his defense.
Interference with such preparation for an unspecified reason of security, such as
policies and procedures of a jail or other facility, have an impact upon the
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Defendant's ability to prepare for his defense and be in the frame of mind necessary
to testify, confront witnesses, appear before the Court and appear before a jury and
further participate in his defense. Where there is not specific direction given by the
Utah Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, it seems to be at the discretion of the
trial court to justify the shackling of those in the custody of a correctional facility and
to simply provide them with clothes from a prison guard that is less obvious but
clearly says to a juror these are not my clothes. The impact this has upon a jury is
to call into question the credibility of that witnessfromhis appearance that may not
have anything to do with the charges at hand but a Defendant would be forced to
deal with simply because of a general security policy that is imposed. In the instant
case, there is no way of knowing what impact the fact that Defendant was required
to wear street clothing picked out by the jail facility or was shackled during the time
of trial may have had. While the issue is one that does not appear to have been
directly considered by the Utah Courts, the position seems to be well established in
other jurisdictions that such interference, without evident necessity, materially
abridges and prejudicially affects the Defendant's constructional right of defense.
///
///
///
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CONCLUSION
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, Appellant, DOUGLAS
DOYLE DILLON, prays that relief be granted in reversing the trial court's ruling and
for other and further relief as to this Court appears equitable and proper.
DATED this ^

day of ^ L K / A A / M .

20 0^

£

.

J. BRYAN JACKSON,
Attorney for Appellant Dillon
///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///
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ADDENDUM A
COPIES OF VARIOUS PORTIONS OF THE
RECORD

INSTRUCTION NO. 14a

The knowledge or belief that the property is stolen, required by the
Receiving Stolen Propertyjnstructioi) is presumed in the case of an actor who is
found in possession or control of other property stolen on a separate occasion.
This presumption does not relieve the State from proving every element of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In speaking of the receiving or having
possession of other stolen property the fair interpretation includes "knowing it to
have been stolen." Knowing that the property is stolen is what law condemns;
and it should not be deemed to include any innocent or unaware possession of
stolen property.
While the presumed fact that the defendant was possessing stolen property
must be proved by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, the law regards the
facts giving rise to the presumption as evidence of the presumed fact.

FH FD
R

r

R*r*m B^yw IrenrfP

MAR 2 3 2001
5th DIS1 RIOT COURT
/
IRON COUNTY
—
L _ Deputy Clerk

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT- CEDAR
IRON,COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff
vs.
DOUGLAS DOYLE DILLON
Defendant

EXHIBIT LIST

Case No:: 011500060
Judge:
ROBERT T. BRAITHWAITE
Date:
March 23, 2001

DALE W SESSIONS Attorney for the Defendant
SCOTT M. BURNS Attorney for the Plaintiff
NO. PARTY

DESCRIPTION

OFF REC REF WDN ADV SUB

1

State

photo of trailer

Y

Y

2

State

photo of truck

Y

Y

3

State

photo contents of truck

Y

Y

4

State

photo contents of truck

Y

Y

5

State

photo contents of truck

Y

Y

6

State

list of property, tools, value

Y

Y

7

State

crowbar

Y

8

State

photo of crowbar

Y

9

State

photo of crowbar

Y

10

State

photo of crowbar against trailer

Y

11

State

photo of crowbar against trailer

Y

12

State

photo of crowbar against trailer

Y

13

State

pawn shop receipt

Y

Y

14

State

swap meet receipt

Y

Y

15

State

cranberry/white striped shirt, & ti

Y

Y

Y

ADDENDUM B
COPY OF VARIOUS PORTIONS OF
TRANSCRIPTS FROM APPELLANT'S JURY TRIAL

THE COURT:

What —

can I see the clothes?

MR. DO^EY:

And, Your Honor, Detective Gower could

testify about what was in his truck as far as clothing.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I am being given a plastic sack

with a sweat shirt that says ESPN Sports Center, and a pair of
jeans, regular blue jeans.

What we r e in your effects, what

clothes were in your effects, other than these that you wanted
to wear?
THE DEFENDANT:

I had some shirts with pullover

sleeveless sweaters.
THE COURT:

What kind of shirt?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

A dress shirt, brown shirt.

It's brown in color?

THE DEFENDANT:

Yeah.

I had two or three of them.

I

had a whole duffel bag full of clothes.
THE COURT:

Have we got that here or somewhere?

MR. SESSIONS:

I think that his property is still

probably in his truck, except I do believe that the boots or
shoes are being retained by the sheriff's department as
evidence in another case.

They are not inclined to release

them.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. SESSIONS:

Perhaps Mr. Dillon needs to know that

he 1 11 be'seated over-here during the entire proceeding.

The

jury won't know what's on your feet.

6

THE COURT:

Yeah.

MR. SESSIONS:
THE DEFENDANT:
MR. SESSIONS:

You'll always be seated.
Well, I have to testify.
Right.

But they will put you on the

stand.
THE COURT:

We'll take them out.

We'll take the jury

out, bring you from there up to here, then bring the jury back.
So they will never see your feet.

I'm most concerned and --

really, even the Levis they are not going to see.

But the

sweat shirt -MR. SESSIONS:
THE COURT:

Looks a little

—

Yeah, it seems like

THE DEFENDANT:

—

My whole suitcase came with me into

the jail facility and sat in there for three days.

They took

my jewelry, all my clothes, my boots, out of the facility
somewhere.

So they can't -- for them to say that my stuff,

they don't know what's in my truck, they are not...
THE COURT:

If you've got a dress shirt, that would

look better than a sweat shirt.

Is there a dress shirt that is

not -MR. DOXEY:

Your Honor, Defective Gower, the only

thing he saw in the truck and, correct me if I'm wrong, there
is some wife beater shirts that are buttoned down.
the arms to

He's got

—

THE COURT:

Okay.

By wife beater, you mean a

7

sleeveless T-shirt?
MR. DOXEY:
mean to interrupt

Yes.

Ifm sorry, Your Honor. , And don't

—

JAIL PERSONNEL:

We did try tp give him one of our

facility shirts that has the striped collar
THE COURT:

—

Dress shirt?

JAIL PERSONNEL:

—

with a red tie that matches the

stripes in it we use for the inmates to take pictures to send
home.

And he didn't want to do that either.
THE COURT:

Is it of a size that fits him?

He's a

pretty big guy.
JAIL PERSONNEL:

I don't know.

(Inaudible.)

It's a

double "X".
THE COURT:

It's a double "X."

THE DEFENDANT:

It might.

I was going back to the fact that they

have a whole suitcase of my clothes that for some reason they
don't want to say they have them.
THE COURT:

I have a jury sitting out here, so I need

to move this as fast as possible.

If we could get you a dress

shirt that fits and a tie, I realize that you don't have any
sentimental value there, but if you look good in that sitting
at that table, then I think we have accomplished what we need
to do.

Do you know where, Mr. Gower, where a brown shirt is?
DETECTIVE GOWER:

It's in his truck.

Well, I looked at his property.

I didn't see any shirts like that.

I can

1

go back and look again if need be.

2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

DETECTIVE GOWER:

4

THE DEFENDANT:

5

Did you see a blue duffel bag?
Yes.
With my cell phone and all 'my stuff in

it?

6

DETECTIVE GOWER:

Blue duffel bag, sir.

7

back and look again if you like.

8

THE DEFENDANT:

9

That was in my property in the jail.

I don't know how it got back in my truck.

10

DETECTIVE GOWER:

11

belongings.

12

to your truck.

13

THE COURT:
do both.

15

shirt, brown one.

16

shirts?

17

We had a search warrant for your

I've gone through your belongings.

14

18

But I can go

Let's move it along.

I took it back

Let's bring —

let's

Let's see if you can find a dress shirt, his dress
Are there any other different colored dress

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

There is a dress shirt in there,

then a nice dress sweater, pullover.

19

THE COURT:

Okay.

Let's see if you can find a dress

20

shirt and a pullover sweater.

21

can't, let's bring a shirt and tie, double "X", and see if that

22

fits.

23

In the meantime, just in case we

Then, let's tell the jury -- I don't know what —

24

we have some legal matters that we are undertaking, that we

25

haven't forgotten them.

Okay.

that

1

(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

2

THE COURT:

Back on

the record in the Dillon case.

3

And we have —

4

clothes, basically.

5

clothes, and the third set was from the jail.

6

three, he selected the first set to our clothes; is that

7
8
9

I

we had, as I understand it, three sets of
The first set, the second set o*f private
And of those

correct?
MR. SESSIONS:

He has.

Your Honor, he does object.

But just to make the record,

He wanted an opportunity to select

10

his own clothing and doesn't believe that it was meanfully

11

presented to him.

12

was in the corridor when the clothes were brought that

13

Detective Gower found from his vehicle.

14

was ultimately provided from the facility.

15

interchange.

16
17
18
19

THE COURT:

He didn't have an opportunity to do that.

All right.

And the shirt and tie
So I did see that

And the shirt from the

facility -- why don't you hold it up there at the podium.
MR. DOXEY:

(Inaudible) mark it into evidence if we

are going to have an issue here.

20

THE COURT:

All right.

21

MR. DOXEY:

And I brought my other exhibits marked,

22

Your Honor, so if I could maybe mark this particular item

23

Exhibit No. 15.

24

THE COURT:

All right.

Dress shirt and tie?

25

MR. DOXEY:

Dress shirt and tie.

I

1

It is the state's position -- I believe you will find

2

beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Dillon, after Mr. Braun

3

left, went out to the job site, broke into the trailer and kept

4

all the property.

5

these events took place in Iron County.

6

Itfs a pretty simple fact scenario.

All

Okay.

When Detective Gower and Detective -- or, rather,

7

Police Officer Edwards saw the truck, it was sitting at the

8

Value Inn here in Cedar City.

9

confiscated, taken to the sheriff's department.

And that's where it was

10

warrant was obtained.

11

out and found it to be Mr. Braun's.

12

Simple fact scenario.

13

And a search

And then they took all of the property
Okay.

Pretty simple.

And I want you to listen to the evidence closely.

14

Listen to both the prosecution and the defense.

15

convinced that when you listen to the evidence you conclude

16

that Mr. Dillon knew exactly what he was doing.

17

out there w i t h

IS

stole the p r o p e r t y and then kept it, r e t a i n e d

L9

what I b e l i e v e

the intent to b u r g l a r i z e

the e v i d e n c e will b e .

!0

THE COURT:

!1

MR. SESSIONS:

2

Okay.

That he went

that t r a i l e r .

Thank

it.

But I'm

And

And

he

that's

you.

Mr. Sessions?
Your Honor, I would like to reserve my

opening statement until the presentation of my evidence.

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

Let's hear the first witness then.

4

MR. DOXEY:

Yes, Your Honor.

5

stipulated proffer.

We have, I believe, a

If called to testify, Officer Kelly

Edwards would testify that he made contact with Mr. Dillon
about 3 o'clock in the morning on the 18th of January 2001.
Officer Edwards would further testify that he was able to look
in the back of the defendant's truck and saw a Honda generator,
and that he ultimately made a report of his findings and filed
it with the Cedar City Police Department.
MR. SESSIONS:
THE COURT:

Accepted.

Okay.

What that means is, that both sides

agree that if he took the stand, that is what Mr. Edwards would
say.
Go ahead and call your next witness.
MR. DOXEY:

Yes, Your Honor.

The state calls Mr. Tom

Braun.
THOMAS BRAUN,
called by PLAINTIFF, having been duly
sworn, was examined and testifies as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. DOXEY:
Q

Mr. Braun, will you state your name for the record.

A

Thomas Braun.

Q

And how are you employed?

A

Self-employed, Braun-Rich Construction.

Q

Okay.

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

You build houses?

Mr. Braun, as I ask you questions, it will seem

a little awkward, but I'll ask you to turn and speak to the
jury.

They need to hear your voice more than I do.

And if I

I

can't hear you, then I'll know I'll ne^d to ask you to speak

1

up.

5

turn to them.

it may seem a little bit odd, you'll get the question then

Do you recall the date of January 17th, 2001?

6
7

A

I do.

8

Q

Okay.

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Do you recall about what time you finished working?

A

About

Q

Okay.

A

Normally.

J

Q

5 o'clock in the afternoon?

J

A

Correct.

Q

Where were you working at the time?

A

Cross Hollow Hills.

Q

Is that within Iron County?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

Framing a house.

Q

Framing a house?

1

Where were you -- were you working on that date?

5

o'clock.

Just south of Cedar City, right?

1

And what were you doing there?

J

Okay.

And as part of your job on

that date, did you use your tools?

1

2

Q

I

Okay.

And do you recall the date of January 18th,

2001?
A

I do.

Q

Do you recall seeing Mr. Braun on that date?

5

A

I do.

6

Q

What was the nature of your first contact with Mr.

4

7

I

I

Braun?
A

9

I

10

12

turn in a list of items stolen from his job trailer.
Q

11

He come to the front window of our office to hand -- to

Okay.

At that point, what did you do when you first

learned of it?
I

What did you first do?

A

With Mr. Braun?

Q

With Mr. Braun.

A

I was just stepping out the door to do some information

I had received.

I first got word of this, that Mr. Braun's

theft and burglary, from another deputy.

I had already made a

few phone calls and was en route to go to where Mr. Dillon's
vehicle was to see what I could see.
just as I was leaving.
Q

Okay.

And Mr. Braun come in

And I asked him to come with me.

Thank you.

Did you both travel to the location

of the truck?
A

Yes.

Q

Where was it?

A

It was the Value Inn, I believe at 344 South Main

Street here in Cedar City.

Q

Okay.

And were you able to look inside the back of the

truck?
A

Yes.

Q

Did Mr. Braun identify the property as his?

A

Immediately.

Q

Did Mr. Braun1s property that he identified match with

the list that he had provided you?
A
down.

There were some items on there that he hadn't wrote
But --

Q

Some items in the truck that he hadn't written down?

A

Right.

Q

Okay.

A

Yes.

Q

And based on what you had seen and Mr. Braun1s

Generally, did they coincide?

representations, did you obtain a search warrant?
A

I did.

Q

Okay.

And was the truck ultimately towed to the Iron

County Sheriff's Office?
A

Yes.

Q

Did you execute the warrant?

A

I did.

Q

How did you gain access to the back of his truck?

A*

The search warrant encompassed both items within the

truck and, also, property, personal belongings that were booked
into jail with Mr. Dillon.

I went to booking at the Iron

County Jail, obtained keys to the vehicle, went out, and the
vehicle was locked; the camper shell, specifically; found a key
on the key ring that matched the camper shell and opened it.
Q

So his key that was in his pocket matched the back of

the camper shell?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

Yes.

And the truck was fully secured until that time?
I remained with it until it was towed to our

parking lot.
Q

Okay.

And the doors were locked and the back was

locked?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

Did you then get all the property out, all the

items within the truck out of the truck?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

And I show you what's been marked as State's

Exhibits No., actually start with 2 through 5.
recognize —

just take a look at those.

Do you

Do you recognize those

pictures?
A

Yes, I do.

Q

Okay.

A

I did.

Q

Okay.

Did you take those pictures?

And do they accurately depict what was within

Mr. Dillonfs truck?
A

Yes.

Q

How do you know it was Mr. Dillon's truck?

A

The registration, when run through our computers, come

back in his name.
Q

And among the items that you found in the truck, did

you find a crowbar?
A

Yes.

Q

I show you what's been marked as State's Exhibit No. 1.

Is that the crowbar that you found within his trunk?
A

Yes.

Appears to be.

Q

Did you notice anything distinctive about that

particular crowbar?
A

Distinctive, it had one ear up here bent as if it had

pried something.
Q

Are there any markings on it?

A

There is some white paint transfer onto it.

Q

Okay.

A

It would be here.

And where is the white paint transfer?
The majority of it here.

Some here,

And some about right here.
Q

Okay.

faded a bit.

All right.

And I understand the paint may have

I show you what's been marked as, let's go to

State's Exhibit —

out of order a little bit —

you recognize those photos?
A

Yes.

Q

Who took them?

A

I did.

8 and 9.

Do

Q

Okay.

Among those documents, did you find State's

Exhibit No. 13?
A

Yes.

Q

Did you also see State's Exhibit 14'?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

They were located within the cab of the vehicle.

Q

Okay.

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

Where were those documents?

Did you find them?

And what is

—

MR. DOXEY:

Your Honor, I would like to approach.

THE COURT:

Okay.
(Whereupon, a sidebar conference
was held off the record.)

(Whereupon, the following proceedings were held in
open court outside the presence of the jury.)
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. SESSIONS:

Your Honor, at this time I would like

to make an objection to the exhibits and what I think the
anticipated testimony is concerning those exhibits.
THE COURT:

These are 13 and 14?

MR. SESSIONS:

These are 13 and 14.

My understanding

is that these exhibits are not related to the theft, are not
tied to the theft or the equipment thatfs been recovered, but
are attempted to be used by the state to show some kind of

furtherance of a plan or design that's unrelated and untied to
this case.

So my objection goes to relevance.

highly prejudicial to the jury.

Itfs also

I thirik if a jury sees what

these two items of evidence are, that they may jump to a
conclusion that is unfair in light of the elements of this case
and the requirements of this matter.
MR. DOXEY:
slip.

Your Honor, what they are, first is a pawn

It's a pawn slip for power tools.

That I believe the

pawn slip is out of Mesquite, Nevada; isn't that correct?
THE WITNESS:
MR. DOXEY:

This one's out of Jackson, Wyoming.
Out of Jackson.

Okay.

And the second is

a receipt, that is a, what you call it, a swap meet receipt.
Okay.

I anticipate Detective Gower will testify that when

people possess stolen property, it's (inaudible) by swap meets
and pawn shops.
THE COURT:

Wouldn't this be evidence of prior bad act

MR. DOXEY:

It is, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

How is that permissible?

MR. DOXEY:

I think what it does, is it shows a common

then?

if

But I think it

—

—

scheme or plan, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Go ahead.

MR. SESSIONS:

I think the testimony that's already

introduced by the state from the victim is that he's recovered

there's been any intentional hiding of anything.

But they

havenft been able to prepare to defend against this portion.
MR. DOXEY:

But, Your Honor, Detective Gower could

testify that he was in possession of other property that was
stolen that was within the confines of discovery.
THE COURT:

What part of the nine questions?

MR. DOXEY:

Just that Detective Gower would testify

surrounding the facts contained in the police report, Your
Honor.

Itfs all in the police report.

The defendant was

convicted, Your Honor, on March 1st up there in Fillmore.

But

every bit of this information about the other stolen property,
Your Honor, is in the police report as is the fact that -MR. SESSIONS:

Well, I don't mean to interrupt you.

But I would simply argue that while it may be in a police
report, it's certainly not factually determined in the police
report.
THE COURT:

Let me take a look at the police report.

We've got the police report.
MR. DOXEY:

It's at the end?

I'm sorry, Your Honor.

Let me find it.

it starts with... and Your Honor, I would also note that we are
attempting to bring an officer from Washington County on the
same basis to testify more construction site burglaries down in
Washington County also contained in this police report.
fact, I have somebody on his way now.

In

I think I found it.

I

just want to make sure I'm pointing out all of it because it's

in two or three places.

Your Honor, I kind of starred the

general area With my pencil.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I think there are three stars.
So the second star, it says,

"Search warrant executed at about 1615 hours on 1/18/01,
Detective Edwards, Millard County deputy, Sergeant Cory" -excuse me, "Scott Cory, Bill Jackson, and I served a search
warrant at that time.

All contents in Dillon's vehicle that

were suspected to be evidence removed from the vehicle and
photographed.

Each item was logged down with its serial number

if the item had one.

Sergeant Scott Cory was able to identify

some items in the Dillon vehicle that were stolen from a
construction site in Millard County on or about 1/14/01.

These

items are a Monson Engineering tripod, serial number 63618,
item two; construction elevation rod, item three; a Bosch
jigsaw, serial number 5099, item 24.

Above listed items, along

with a set of bolt cutters, item 36, were released to Sergeant
Cory on 1/18/01 at about 1800 hours."
So that's what -- your allegation is that that was
found within the truck?
MR. DOXEY:

Um-hmm.

THE COURT:

And

MR. DOXEY:

Detective Gower can testify that the

—

property was found within the truck, and that he went up and
saw the defendant convicted of the crime and be sentenced.
THE COURT:

Okay.

This is a new area for me.

And it

seems to go against what Ifm used to ruling as far as evidence
of prior bad atfts.

But it also does appear to be an element of

subsection (2) that is permitted under the statute.

I guess

I've reversed myself a couple of times, so before I make a
final ruling I'll let the defense respond.

It appears that

this does conform with that subsection.
MR. SESSIONS:

And it may very well, Your Honor.

But

I think that what the court has to be really careful with is,
that even if we were to admit that evidence or you were to
accept that, that I don't think that the state should be able
to put on any additional evidence about it and that, instead,
the court should simply have a jury instruction which we
fashion which would include the knowledge or belief or
requirement which the state's relying on in paragraph (b).
THE COURT:

Two (b)?

MR. SESSIONS:

Two (b), yes.

Isn't that what your

argument is, David?
MR. DOXEY:

Two.

MR. SESSIONS:

Oh, my mistake.

Found in possession or

control from a separate occasion.
THE COURT:

Why wouldn't he be allowed to put on

evidence today?
MR. SESSIONS:
jury.

Well, I think it's inflammatory to the

If you are going to put on evidence of a misdemeanor

offense of an attempted crime in another jurisdiction, I think

1

that that1s slamming this defendant.

2

leap that ta kes place between saying that the knowledge and

3

belief element, if they find —

4

is far different than allowing evidence that speaks about the

5

nature of another crime, prior bad acts in conjunction with the

6

evidence in this case.
MR. DOXEY:

7

I think there's a big

that that element is sa tisfied,

That!s where the prejudice occurs.

But we are not talking about Rule 403 or

And we are not talking about 803 about prior convictions.

8

402.

9

What we are talking about is an element of crime.

10

MR. SESSIONS:

11

MR. DOXEY:

12

(Inaudible.)

And we don't even get to 403.

We don' t

even get to 402.
THE COURT:

13

We also need evidence for the jury

14

instruction to tie to; otherwise, it's just hanging out there

15

with nothing to connect to the case.

16

MR. DOXEY:

I agree.

17

THE COURT:

So it appears to me that the state should

18

be able to put on limited evidence that just focuses on 2(a)

19

and (b) .

20

that he was found in possession and control of another property

21

stol(5 on a separate occasion and has 'received --it's ( a),

22

isn! 1
t it?

23

other.

24

gave it to h im?

25

The evidence that they have that they allege shows

0r have we got -- or you are saying it's one or the

He's got stolen property, either he took it or somebody

MR. DOXEY:

It's actually both, Your Honor.

W ell, he

1

either took it or received it.

I mean, it's —

I don't

2

think —

3

have to do is retain it.

4

convict on receiving stolen property if he's the one that

5

actually took it, too.

that definition of receiving stolen property, all you

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. SESSIONS:

You don't even have to —

you could

Do you want to add something else?
Yes.

I guess what troubles me about

8

trying to qualify this as a (b) exception is that he wasn't

9

convicted of receiving stolen property.

To introduce evidence

10

of that conviction, then I tliink that the jury ought to know

11

what he's been convicted of.

12

attempted crime, then they need to have a legal explanation

13

about what attempted means, because that's the nature of the

14

offense.

15

exception, and that he's found in possession or control of the

16

property on a separate occasion, all this statute does is

17

satisfy one element of the offense.

18

does not open the door wide to receive any evidence

19

particularly about it.

20

evidence.

21

And if he is convicted of an

If the state argues that he -- that it's an (a)

That's all it does.

It

The statute doesn't say anything about

It just simply cures that one element.
MR. DOXEY:

I don't know how I'm supposed ^ o even get

22

to this u n l e s s

I put on e v i d e n c e that he w a s found

23

possession.

24

evidentiary the way it comes in.

25

w a y , h e r e ' s a jury i n s t r u c t i o n w i t h o u t any facts to support

I mean,

in

I think that it n e c e s s a r i l y h a s to b e

We can't just say, oh, by the
it.

1
2

THE COURT:
1

Okay.

need to make a ruling.

We need to move forward.

And I

And we'll make a record of it.

EitheL

3

side can argue it.

If there is an appeal, the Court of Appeals

4

can correct me if Ifm wrong.

5

continued discussion that we have had, I'll allow you to

6

present evidence in regards to both (a) and (b) since they are

7

elements of the case.

But Ifm going to, based on the

8

MR. DOXEY:

Thank you, Your Honor.

9

THE COURT:

Let's bring the jury back in.

10

already under oath and on the stand.

11

stand, Deputy Gower.

He's

So you can retake the

He can go back up.

U

MR. DOXEY:

Yes, he needs to go back up on the stand.

13

THE COURT:

But not —

14

let's have counsel approach.

(Whereupon, a sidebar conference

15

was held off the record.)

16

THE COURT:

Oh, this is Mr. Sessions'.

17

(Whereupon, the following proceedings were held

18

in open court in the presence of the jury.)

19

BY MR. DOXEY:

20

Q

Detective Gower, where do you live?

21

A

In Meadow's Ranch Subdivision in Cedar City.

22

Q

Okay.

23

Is that out beyond the Cross Hollow Subdivision

if yoti are traveling west?

24

A

It's just across the road.

25

Q

Very close to it?

